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11 Introduction
The per-child value of child tax beneﬁts in the U.S. federal income tax has more than
doubled since 1992 in real terms. The total cost of child tax beneﬁts provided by the
federal government is large; about 150 billion dollars for 2008. This is larger than the tax
expenditure from the deductibility of mortgage interest for owner-occupied homes, larger
than the tax expenditure from the exclusion of pension contributions and earnings, and even
larger than the tax expenditure from the exclusion of employer contributions to medical
insurance premiums. The large budgetary cost of child tax beneﬁts suggests that it should
be an important topic in the public ﬁnance literature. This however, is not the case. Child
beneﬁts in the tax code have not received nearly as much attention by economists as the
other tax expenditures listed.1 If the expansion in the value of child tax beneﬁts continues
at the same rapid pace, the need for careful economic analysis will become even more urgent.
This paper takes a ﬁrst step by creating and analyzing a measure of total child tax beneﬁts
by income level, tax ﬁling status, number of children, and year. I focus on describing the
tax provisions, how they have changed, how they interact, and how there can be unintended
consequences when individual tax provisions adjusted in isolation.
Child tax beneﬁts in the United States are not given through a single well-designed
structure. Rather, they are given by the combination of several diﬀerent tax provisions
that each explicitly depend on the number of children, but interact with each other in ways
that are hidden in the complexity of the tax code. Tax beneﬁts for families with children
have some unusual properties that seem unintentional. The 2003 changes to the Child and
Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) is an example that highlights misunderstanding by policy
makers. While the CDCC expansion was clearly aimed at decreasing the after-tax cost of
child care for low-income working women, the new tax code left most of the intended target
1There are several studies that examine individual tax provisions that depend on the number of children.
However, the only prior study, of which I am aware, that looks at how children are treated by the combination
of provisions in the U.S. federal income tax code is Ellwood and Liebman (2001).
2group with no child care subsidy. This example illustrates the importance of considering
child tax beneﬁt provisions in combination rather than individually.
Child tax beneﬁts reduce the costs of raising children and are often seen as a way for
the government to support or promote families. The greatly expanded child tax beneﬁts are
now, for some taxpayers, larger than estimates of the minimal cost of raising children, the
“necessary” level of basic expenditure on children. While estimates of the level of expenditure
necessary to raise a child span a wide range, child tax beneﬁts were far below even the lowest
estimates in the early 1990s; however, today this is no longer the case.
The measure of child tax beneﬁts varies substantially over time and over families by
income, marital status, and number of children. One can argue that changes to child tax
beneﬁts over time are exogenous and they could be used in a natural experiment research
design to identify the eﬀect of child subsides on some outcome or even an income eﬀect. A
disadvantage of using this measure in a natural experiment research design is that there is
no diﬀerence in child tax treatment for identical families in a particular year. The variation
comes only over time or across families with diﬀerent income, diﬀerent marital status, or
diﬀerent numbers of children.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the various tax provisions that
provide child tax beneﬁts. Section 3 describes how child tax beneﬁts diﬀer for families by
income, marital status, and number of children. Section 4 describes how child tax beneﬁts
have changed over time and also presents the case study of the CDCC increase. Section
5 reports estimates of the cost of raising children in comparison to the child tax beneﬁts.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Tax Provisions with Child Beneﬁts
The internal revenue code deﬁnes all income “from whatever source derived” as taxable
unless there is a speciﬁc statute that exempts it from taxation (§63, §61). Claims that
3expenses associated with raising a child should be deductible because they constitute a cost
of earning income or an unavoidable loss to the taxpayer have been rejected by the courts.2
Instead, child tax beneﬁts were introduced gradually into the tax code by Congress in the
form of several tax provisions that give favorable treatment to tax units with dependent
children.3 In this section, I explain how the various federal income tax provisions combine
and interact to subsidize children starting with those provisions which provide beneﬁts to
low-income families.
2.1 Earned Income Tax Credit
The modern Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was introduced in the Tax Reduction Act of
1975.4 The EITC is characterized by a phase in of the credit as income increases, followed
by a plateau, and then a phase out. For its ﬁrst decade, the EITC had a maximum value of
$400 to $500 and only beneﬁted families at the very low end of the income distribution. The
purpose of the EITC was to reduce the tax burden for these low-income families (motivated
as a way to oﬀset payroll taxes) while also providing additional work incentives in the phase-
in portion of the credit. The EITC is refundable meaning that the full value of the credit is
paid even when the value of the credit exceeds the tax liability of the taxpayer.
The EITC was not originally designed to function as a child subsidy, but the credit was
limited to those with children in order to deny beneﬁts to students, retired people, and
young part-time workers. Eﬀorts in the early 1990s to provide increased tax relief and work
2For example, in Smith v. Commissioner (1940), the court found that child care expenses could not be
claimed as a cost of earning income.
3Before the uniﬁed deﬁnition of a qualifying child was enacted in 2005, there were ﬁve diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of a child in the federal tax code. Under the uniﬁed deﬁnition, there are four requirements which must be
met to claim a qualifying child: (1) The child must be the taxpayer’s unmarried relative, adopted child, or
foster child. (2) The child must live with the taxpayer for more than half the year (time away from home for
school counts). (3) The child must be under age 19 (13 for the child care expenses credit, 17 for the child
tax credit, and 24 if a full-time student for the dependent exemption and earned income credit). (4) The
taxpayer must have provided over half of the child’s support for the year.
4The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is now oﬃcially called the Earned Income Credit (EIC). Because
the economic literature generally uses EITC, I will follow the convention.
4incentives to families with greater needs resulted in an expanded EITC that increases in
family size.5 Because the credit increases quite substantially in value if a taxpayer goes from
zero to one child and then again from one to two children, the EITC is the most important
source of child tax beneﬁts at the low end of the income distribution.
In 2008, a childless married couple with combined annual earnings of $15,850 (placing
them just above the poverty line) would have received only a $4 credit. However, with a
child they would receive a $2,917 credit. With two children they would receive a $4,824
credit. This couple faces a sizable child subsidy, but no wage subsidy. Regardless of the
number of children, the EITC does not increase in value if they earn more income because
$15,850 places them already well beyond the phase-in portion of the credit.6
Taxpayers with children do not need to wait until they ﬁle their taxes to claim these child
tax beneﬁts; they can ask for the EITC to be paid by installments in advance through their
employer’s payroll system. The employer makes advance EITC payments to the employee
throughout the year and then the taxpayer claims the remaining amount when ﬁling the
federal tax return. EITC beneﬁts do not generally aﬀect eligibility for welfare programs like
Medicaid, supplemental security income, food stamps, or low-income housing.
The EITC is phased in at a rate of 40 percent for a taxpayer with two or more children
and at a rate of 34 percent for a taxpayer with one child. Figure 1 shows how the implicit
child subsidy depends on income by graphing the diﬀerence in the value of the earned income
credit for a married couple with two children and the value of child tax beneﬁts for a married
couple with no children. Since the 1986 tax reform, the EITC is adjusted for inﬂation and
thus, the values shown in Figure 1 should remain relatively unchanged in real terms unless
altered by future legislation. The 2006 dollar child tax beneﬁts are represented in Figure
1 rather than 2007 or 2008 values because of the additional diﬃculty in representing the
5In 1991, the EITC was changed so as to give a larger credit value to families with more than one child.
The largest increase in the value of the EITC was due to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993. A small
credit was introduced in 1994 for taxpayers without children.
6The phase-in portion of the 2008 EITC ended at $5,700 for married couples with no children, $8,550 for
married couples with one child, and at $12,050 for married couples with two children.
5negative value of marginal child tax beneﬁts from the economic stimulus payments.
2.2 Child Tax Credit
The centerpiece of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was the introduction of a $400 tax credit
in 1998 for each child under age 17. The legislation increased the value of the credit to $500
for 1999. The Child Tax Credit (CTC) was generally non-refundable, although a portion
was refundable in some circumstances for families with three or more children by claiming
the Additional Child Tax Credit.7
The value of the Child Tax Credit remained at $500 in 2000 and then increased to $600
in 2001. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 provided for the
credit level to increase gradually until it reached $1,000 in 2010. The Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 accelerated the intended increases jumping the CTC
immediately to $1,000 per child and even making advance payments to families who had
claimed the credit in 2002. These advance payments were enacted in order to increase
consumer spending due to fears of an economic recession, similar to economic stimulus
payments in 2008.
Another important Child Tax Credit characteristic that changed over this period was
its movement from a non-refundable credit to a refundable credit. In 2001, the CTC was
made partially refundable with the amount of the refund equal to 10 percent of earnings
over $10,000, up to the full credit value. The phase-in point is inﬂation adjusted each year
so that the 2007 value is $11,750. The rate at which the credit is phased in was increased
from 10 to 15 percent in 2004. The CTC is phased out at a rate of 5 percent for income over
$110,000 for married couples and $75,000 for single parents.
These characteristics make the CTC quite similar to the EITC. The provisions were
7Before 2001, a family with three or more children received a refundable child credit to the extent that
the employee share of Social Security taxes plus individual income taxes exceeds its Earned Income Tax
Credit.
6enacted for diﬀerent purposes, but have very similar properties. Both credits are refundable
and provide an earnings subsidy for those with income levels in the phase-in portion. Both
depend explicitly on children and provide large child tax beneﬁts. Both credits also phase
out, which increases the implicit marginal tax rate for those in the relevant income range.
The major diﬀerence is the income range over which they operate, with overlap in the $10,000
to $40,000 range.
Figure 1 also graphs the value of the CTC for a married couple with two children. As
the ﬁgure shows, the CTC phases-in quite rapidly to a value of $1,000 per child and then
phases-out slowly for incomes above $110,000. The CTC can not be claimed by married
couples with incomes above $130,000 for one child, $150,000 for two children, $170,000 for
three children, and so on.8 Because the phase-in point is inﬂation adjusted and the phase-out
point is not, without future changes, the CTC will provide beneﬁts to a smaller range of the
income distribution over time.
2.3 Exemptions for Dependents
The exemption for dependents was the ﬁrst child tax beneﬁt in the U.S. federal income
tax. It was introduced in 1917, the ﬁfth year of the modern income tax. When the United
States entered World War I, Congress had a bipartisan willingness to go along with the
administration’s request for revenue and the income tax provided the apparatus to raise
revenue quickly. The marginal tax rates increased dramatically–the top rate increased from
7 to 67 percent–and the personal exemption level was cut in half. Over the next four years,
the number of taxpayers increased by a factor of ﬁfteen. This large increase in the number
of families that would be subject to the income tax introduced concerns about the fairness
8There have been proposals in Congress to increase these phase-out points substantially. A common
criticism of the phase-out point is that it creates a marriage penalty for couples with children. A husband
and wife each making $65,000 would not be able to claim the CTC for one child because their combined
income would exceed the maximum. However, they would receive the full credit if they divorce because the
credit does not begin to phase out until $75,000 for single parents.
7of the tax, which then became the motivation for the introduction of a $200 dependent
exemption in 1917. At the time, the personal exemption level was $1,000 for adults.9 After
World War I, the dependent exemption was increased to $400 where it stayed until World
War II.
Instead of aﬀecting only the top 10 to 20 percent of the income distribution, the income
tax continued expanding during World War II until nearly all U.S. households were subject
to it. Congress argued that “the gold is in the foothills, not in the mountains” (Fox 2001, 44).
To accomplish this, Congress cut the personal exemption for singles and married couples,
but reduced the dependent exemption only slightly. In 1944, the dependent exemption was
increased to $500 to match the value of the personal exemption for an adult.
Between 1944 and 1984 (when inﬂation indexing began), the dependent exemption changed
only ﬁve times, increasing in steps from $500 to $1,000. However, the value of the dependent
exemption varied much more because unlike the EITC and the CTC, the value of the depen-
dent exemption depends on the marginal tax rate. A $1,000 deduction from taxable income
is worth $150 to a taxpayer in a 15 percent marginal tax bracket, but $350 to a taxpayer in
a 35 percent marginal tax bracket. This feature is illustrated in Figure 1 which graphs the
tax value of the dependent exemption. The dependent exemption level jumped $820 in the
1986 tax reform and has increased to account for inﬂation each year since.
Exemptions are phased out for high income taxpayers. However, in practice, the phase
out is rarely binding due to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Under AMT rules certain
deductions are not allowed, others are calculated diﬀerently, and a diﬀerent rate schedule
is applied. Taxpayers must calculate their tax liability under both the regular rules and
the AMT rules and pay the maximum of the two.10 Dependent exemptions are not allowed
9In 1917, the exemption level was set at $1,000 for singles and $2,000 for married couples, however, the
exemption level for married couples was not always twice the level for singles. For example, in 1921 the
exemption level for married couples was increased to $2,500 while the level for singles remained at $1,000.
10Charitable contributions are still deductible under AMT rules as is home mortgage interest. However,
state and local taxes, job related expenses, and interest on some home equity loans are not deductible under
the AMT rules.
8under the AMT. For a given level of income, this means that the AMT is much more likely
to bind for a family with a larger number of children. The decline in value of the dependent
exemption shown in Figure 1 is due to the AMT, not the built-in phase out of exemptions.
The exact income point at which the AMT begins to bind depends on the type, not just
the amount, of deductions. Figure 1 is calculated assuming average deduction levels as
reported in the IRS Statistics of Income.11 By reducing marginal tax rates, the Bush tax
cuts decreased the value of the dependent exemption. In addition, the reduction in tax rates
increased the importance of the AMT which further reduced the value of the dependent
exemption for high-income families.
2.4 Child and Dependent Care Credit
The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) began in 1954 as an itemized deduction for
work-related child care expenses. Prior to this tax provision, the courts ruled that child care
expenses were not deductible (Smith v. Commissioner, 1940). The deduction was limited
to households making less than $4,500 annually and was limited to $600 in total child care
expenses. Congress updated the deduction in 1964 so that it would apply to households
making less than $6,000 and increased the limit to $900, but the value of the deduction was
still quite small given the low marginal tax rates in this range of the income distribution.
In addition, only households that itemized their deductions were able to claim it. Thus few
households claimed the deduction and those who did only beneﬁted by an average of $70 per
year (Nelson and Warring, 1982).
In 1971, the deduction’s income ceiling tripled and the maximum allowable deduction
increased to $4,800. However, this did little to increase the number of households that
11The hypothetical married couple used to create the ﬁgures allocates approximately 15 percent of their
income to deductible expenses under the regular rules. This implies that the couple begins to itemize
deductions starting at about $70,000 of income. By assumption, 50 percent of these expenses are charitable
contributions, home mortgage interest that is deductible under the AMT, or medical expenses subject to the
AMT rules. The remaining 50 percent is assumed to be not allowed under the AMT.
9beneﬁted, so in 1976, Congress replaced the child care deduction with a child care credit.
The credit value was set at 20 percent of qualiﬁed expenses, up to $2,000 per child, and
the income cap was removed. As a credit, the beneﬁts were no longer linked to itemizing,
so in theory, households at any income level could receive the subsidy. However, because
the CDCC is a non-refundable credit, beneﬁts are limited to households with tax liability
which excludes most low-income households. The AMT does not aﬀect the CDCC which
means that it does not decline in value for high-income taxpayers. An important feature of
the CDCC is that in order for a married couple to claim the credit, both spouses must have
labor earnings at or above the level of child care expenditures.
In 1981, the 20 percent rate was changed to a schedule starting at 30 percent and then
moving down to 20 percent in steps occurring at speciﬁc income levels. Similar steps in the
2006 CDCC rate schedule are responsible for the small drops that are apparent in Figure
1 at about the $40,000 income level. In 1981, the limit was increased to $2,400 of child
care expenses per child. There were no changes to the CDCC from 1981 until 2003, which,
because it is not inﬂation indexed, caused its value to taxpayers to decline substantially. In
2003, Congress increased the limit on qualifying expenses to $3,000 per child and adjusted
the credit rate schedule so that the maximum credit rate increased to 35 percent.
There is an alternative tax provision that provides tax beneﬁts to families with child
care expenses. Dependent Care Assistance Plans (child care ﬂex spending accounts) are an
employee beneﬁt that allows families to pay for child care with pre-tax income. Participation
in this program excludes a taxpayer from claiming the Child and Dependent Care Credit,
so taxpayers must choose one or the other. Dependent Care Assistance Plans allow an
employee to place up to $5,000 of pre-tax income into a ﬂexible spending account for child
care expenses. Paying for child care with pre-tax income means that this beneﬁt will be
worth more to taxpayers in higher marginal tax brackets and little or nothing to low-income
taxpayers. One feature common to both programs is that low-income families do not receive
any child care subsidies. For middle and high-income families, the diﬀerences between the two
10tax provisions means that families with children face a tax planning problem. A comparison
of the two provisions is given in Madrian (1996). The Madrian (1996) analysis was performed
before the CDCC expansion and the Bush tax cuts and so while the speciﬁc calculations
no longer apply, the underlying analysis is still helpful in understanding which program
provides larger beneﬁts. In general, high-income families may have slightly larger beneﬁts
if they participate in an employer plan. Therefore, the value of the CDCC as graphed in
Figure 1 is a lower bound for the value of child care tax beneﬁts for high-income families.
2.5 Head of Household Filing Status
The head of household ﬁling status was created by Congress in 1951 in order to give single
parents more favorable tax treatment than single individuals with no dependents. While
the head of household status is not exclusively given to single taxpayers with children, it is
the presence of a child that most often puts a taxpayer in this category. To claim head of
household status, a taxpayer must provide at least half the cost of maintaining the household
and be unmarried or an abandoned spouse with at least one dependent.
The beneﬁt of the head of household ﬁling status is a larger standard deduction and a
more generous tax schedule than those with single ﬁling status. Figure 2 shows the 2006 tax
schedule for each ﬁling status. Those with single ﬁling status reach higher tax brackets at
lower levels of taxable income than those with head of household status. Figure 3 graphs the
value of child tax beneﬁts by tax provision for a single parent with two children. The value
of the head of household status (shaded in black) increases in those income ranges where the
tax rate for single ﬁlers is higher than the tax rate for head of household ﬁlers. It begins to
decline at the point where the taxpayer begins itemizing (shown at about $60,000 in Figure
3). Then at slightly more than $140,000 of income, the value of head of household status
declines again because there is no diﬀerence in the treatment of single ﬁling status and head
of household ﬁling status in the AMT.
113 The Distribution of Child Tax Beneﬁts
The ﬁve tax provisions discussed in Section 2 are the major source of child tax beneﬁts in
the U.S. federal income tax. Here we will look at the combined eﬀect of these tax provisions
as well as the 2008 stimulus payments in providing child tax beneﬁts. In addition, there are
other tax provisions which provide child tax beneﬁts including education beneﬁts like the
hope and lifetime learning credits as well as adoption beneﬁts. However, these and other
child tax beneﬁts are much smaller in terms of their aggregate tax expenditure and are
excluded from this analysis.
Nearly all married couples with dependent children receive a child subsidy through the
federal income tax. However, the size of the subsidy is heavily inﬂuenced by income and
the number of children. Figure 4 illustrates this by graphing the combined value of the ﬁve
major child tax beneﬁts by annual adjusted gross income and number of children. About
95 percent of married (ﬁling jointly) taxpayers have an annual adjusted gross income of
less than $200,000 and thus faced the child subsidy level shown in Figure 4 (U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, 2007).
As shown in the ﬁgure, there are large (relative to income) subsidies for low-income
couples with one or two children. A married couple with adjusted gross income of $20,000
receives child tax beneﬁts worth about 20 percent of income with one child and about 30
percent of income with two children. However, the subsidy does not increase if this low-
income couple has more than two children. This is also true at the high end of the income
distribution; married couples with an income above $200,000 receive little or no additional
subsidy for a third or fourth child. It is not clear that Congress intentionally restricted child
tax beneﬁts for a third or higher child for high and low-income couples.
Figure 4 shows a dip in the value of child tax beneﬁts for a married couple with one or two
children and income between about $25,000 and $90,000. Those with higher earnings receive
larger child tax beneﬁts than those in this middle income range. This dip in child beneﬁt
12levels was named the “middle-class parent penalty” by Ellwood and Liebman (2001). The
intuition for the middle-class parent penalty is that low-income families receive large child
tax beneﬁts through the EITC and that high-income families receive large child tax beneﬁts
because the value of dependent exemptions increases for higher tax brackets. However,
middle-income families receive no EITC beneﬁts and do not beneﬁt as much from their
dependent exemptions as higher income families. While there have been several important
changes to child tax beneﬁts since Ellwood and Liebman (2001), their analysis of this dip in
child tax beneﬁts is still valid. However, for families with more than 2 children, the beneﬁts
shown in Figure 4 follow an inverted-U shape with beneﬁts rising for low-income families
and then falling for high-income families. In general, the value of child tax beneﬁts peaks
for couples earning around $100,000 annually.
From the IRS Statistics of Income (2007) we can get a rough picture of how many
taxpayers fall in each range of the income distribution. About 30 percent of joint ﬁlers have
an adjusted gross income of less than $40,000, which places them in the range where there
are little to no additional child tax beneﬁts for third or higher children. About 35 percent of
joint ﬁlers report incomes that place them in the middle-class parent penalty region where
beneﬁts are lower for families with one or two children. Another 35 percent of joint ﬁlers
report incomes above $80,000, with only slightly more than 5 percent of the total reporting
incomes above $200,000.
Not shown in Figure 4 is the value of child beneﬁts in welfare programs. Taxpayers with
no income receive no child tax beneﬁts, but may receive child beneﬁts from welfare programs
if they choose to participate. Some welfare beneﬁts, such as the beneﬁts from the Women,
Infants, and Children program (WIC) do not decrease with income until income exceeds a
ﬁxed eligibility threshold at which point beneﬁts go to zero. However, many welfare beneﬁts
do decline as the participant’s income increases, such as, beneﬁts from the Food Stamps
Program (FSP) and Temporary Aid for Needy Families program (TANF). Over the income
range where these welfare beneﬁts are phased out, child tax beneﬁts are phased in. Generally,
13the value of child beneﬁts in welfare programs do continue to increase for third and higher
children. A full analysis of child welfare beneﬁts would require a detailed review of the
eligibility requirements, beneﬁt formulas, and participation choices of families with children.
States also have their own programs that provide beneﬁts to families with children. This
analysis is outside the scope of the paper and will be left for future research.
There is less evidence for the stylized middle-class parent penalty pattern of beneﬁts
when considering single parents. Figure 5 shows the total value of child tax beneﬁts for
single parents by number of children and annual income. Rather than U-shaped, single
parents seem to face a zigzagged pattern of child tax beneﬁts for their ﬁrst child. The ﬁrst
dip is due to the phase out of the EITC. The subsequent rise in beneﬁts is primarily due to the
head of household tax status. The second dip occurs for taxpayers that itemize deductions
because they lose the value of the increased standard deduction for head of household ﬁling
status and the following rise is due to the advantage of the head of household tax schedule
over that of the single tax schedule. However, this advantage is eliminated for high-income
taxpayers because the AMT treats taxpayers with head of household ﬁling status identically
to those with single ﬁling status. It seems unlikely that Congress intentionally created the
zigzagged pattern of beneﬁt shown in Figure 5.
Compared to married couples, low and middle-income single parents generally have larger
child tax beneﬁts. For many single parents, the beneﬁts are substantially larger; in some
cases a single parent would receive twice the child tax beneﬁts as a married couple with the
same income. Thus the number of children can have an important eﬀect on the size and even
the sign of the “marriage penalty”.12 Child tax beneﬁts for single parents also phase in at the
low end of the income distribution and then phase out at the high end. However, child tax
beneﬁts phase out much earlier in the income distribution for single parents. Rather than
reaching a maximum at around $100,000 of income, the beneﬁts for single parents reach a
12Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington (1999) provide an analysis of the marriage penalty in the U.S.
federal income tax.
14maximum at about $60,000 of income.
Tax provisions that provide beneﬁts to families with children also have an important
eﬀect on the marginal tax rate that these families face. Having a child can either greatly
increase or decrease the marginal tax rate depending on prior family size and income level.
This is a potentially important factor in the labor supply decisions of parents, particularly
secondary workers. Figure 6 shows the marginal tax rate by income level for a married
couple with either one or four children. In general, low-income families face lower marginal
tax rates if they have more children, while high-income couples face higher marginal tax
rates if they have more children.
The value of child tax beneﬁts for low and middle-income families is quite robust to
alternative assumptions on itemized deductions used in calculating the tax bill for the rep-
resentative families used in generating the proceeding ﬁgures. However, the level of itemized
deductions has a strong eﬀect on the value of child tax beneﬁts for high-income families. In
general, larger deductions imply lower child tax beneﬁts because the AMT binds earlier in
the income distribution and reduces the value of the dependent exemption. Because some
deductions are allowed in computing the AMT while others are not, the value of child tax
beneﬁts for high-income families depends on the type of deductions and not only on the total
amount. However, regardless of the type, deductions are phased out when adjusted gross
income exceeds $150,500 for each ﬁling status.
Except for small shifts in the location of kink points, the eﬀects of using alternative de-
duction assumptions are only visible above $190,000 for married couples. For single parents,
the size of itemized deductions inﬂuences child tax beneﬁts earlier in the income distribution.
However, for those making less than about $130,000, there is no meaningful diﬀerence in the
value of child tax beneﬁts between assuming that the individual does not itemize and the
assumptions used in Figure 5. High income single parents that do not itemize and only take
the standard deduction have larger child tax beneﬁts. The IRS reports that only about 8
percent of single parents with annual income above $100,000 take the standard deduction
15(U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 2007). Still, this illustrates a point that is also true for
married couples (although only at even higher income levels); high-income parents receive
lower child tax beneﬁts if they increase their itemized deductions. For example, high-income
parents that live in states with high state taxes (either income or sales) face lower child tax
beneﬁts than those living in states with low state taxes.
4 How Child Tax Beneﬁts Have Changed
Child tax beneﬁts have grown substantially in value. As shown in real terms in Figure 7, the
increase in the early 1990’s beneﬁted low-income families. This was due to the expansion
of the Earned Income Tax Credit. The increase in the late 1990’s beneﬁted middle-income
families and was due to the introduction of non-refundable Child Tax Credit. The increases
since 2002 have beneﬁted a wide range of low and middle-income families (those with $20,000
to $140,000 annual incomes). None of the child tax beneﬁt increases since 1992 have gone
to high-income families. Figure 7 illustrates these points by graphing the value of child tax
beneﬁts in real 2006 dollars for selected years for a married couple with two children.
The sharp drop in the 2008 value of child tax beneﬁts for families earning about $35,000
is due to the 2008 economic stimulus payment’s interaction with other child tax beneﬁts.
As shown in Figure 8, the 2008 stimulus payment for a married couple is $600 if that
couple has no tax liability. It increases by another $600 with tax liability and an additional
$300 per child. The stimulus rules count tax liability before the EITC or the Child Tax
Credit are applied. However, they do not make any adjustment for the tax value of the
additional personal exemption per child. This makes the value of the stimulus payment
higher for couples with no children in the $25,000 to $35,000 income range. Figure 7 shows
the diﬀerence in tax liability for a married couple with two children as compared to no
children. The stimulus payment creates a negative $600 diﬀerence between the two-child
and no-children families at low incomes and a positive $600 diﬀerence at high incomes.
16Table 1 reports the budgetary cost estimates by child tax provision for selected years.13
As the table shows, the growth in child tax beneﬁts has been very expensive; the annual
budgetary cost of child tax beneﬁts increased by nearly 100 billion dollars from 1992 to 2006.
An important component of the increasing cost of providing child tax beneﬁts is the more
than 15 percent increase in the number of children over the period. However, even when
measured on a per-child basis, the budgetary cost of child tax beneﬁts, in real terms, went
from $940 in 1992 to $1,904 in 2006, approximately doubling in just 15 years.
Pro-natalist concerns are the primary motivation for child beneﬁts in many countries
today including France, South Korea, and Russia. In contrast, the political dialogue con-
cerning child tax beneﬁts in the United States avoids any discussion of the eﬀect on fertility.14
Rather, child tax beneﬁts in the U.S. are generally justiﬁed as a way to reduce the incidence
of child poverty, provide incentives for parents to seek employment or increase their employ-
ment hours, foster a more family-oriented society, or simply help families with the ﬁnancial
burden of raising children. Proposals for increases in child tax beneﬁts over the past few
years have generally been accompanied by an assertion that the government should “help
families rear and support their children.”15
The child tax credit’s rapid expansion to $1,000 per child was a quick way of cutting
taxes and getting money into consumer’s hands at a time of low consumer conﬁdence and
fears of a recession (advanced child tax credit checks were sent in 2003 as a way to get the
child tax credit to families sooner). Even with the dramatic increase in the value of child
tax beneﬁt, there is continued pressure from pro-family groups that actively lobby Congress
to increase child tax beneﬁts. In a New York Times article dated September 10, 2006,
13The budgetary cost of child tax beneﬁts is the government expenditure on refundable child tax beneﬁts
combined with the tax expenditure of child tax beneﬁts. The tax expenditure for a tax policy is a measure
of the loss of government revenue due to the policy.
14In the United States, supporters of the legislation increasing child tax beneﬁts over the past 15 years
have not, to my knowledge, made any public statements advocating child tax beneﬁts as a way to increase
fertility rate. However, Powell (1999) presents some evidence, gleaned from memos and reports, that a few
of the key supporters of the 1997 child tax credit hoped that it would increase fertility rates for taxpayers.
15George W. Bush, 2001 State of the Union Address
17David Brooks described a growing push by some pro-family groups to increase the child
tax credit to $5,000. Many politically-active religious groups also promote the expansion of
child tax beneﬁts. Recently proposed legislation in both the Senate and the House, called
the Parents’ Tax Relief Act of 2007 (S 816 IS & HR 1421 IH), would allow a stay-at-home
parent to claim the Child and Dependent Care Credit for the at-home care they provide
for their own children, increase the dependent exemption to $5,000, and allow a deduction
or credit for a home-based business (to encourage stay-at-home parenting). With strong
support and no open opposition, it seems likely that the real value of child tax beneﬁts will
continue to increase in future years.
On the other hand, lawmakers can pass laws that appear to increase tax beneﬁts for
families with children, without actually increasing budgetary cost. As an example, consider
the 2003 increase of the Child and Dependent Care Credit. There were no changes to the
CDCC from 1981 until 2003, which, because it is not inﬂation indexed, caused its tax value
to decline substantially. In 2003, Congress increased the limit on qualifying expenses from
$2,400 to $3,000 per child and the maximum credit rate was increased from 30 to 35 percent.
This means that the maximum tax value for a family with two children went from $1,440
to $2,100. As shown in Figure 9, the rate increase was designed to increase the child care
subsidy rate for low-income working women.
As mentioned in the introduction, this policy change in 2003 is evidence that the structure
of child tax beneﬁts is not well understood by policy makers. The expansion of the credit
rate for the CDCC was enacted in order to decrease child care costs for low-income families,
making it easier for mothers to enter the workforce. However, because the CDCC is non-
refundable, most low-income families were unable to beneﬁt from the CDCC expansion.
Non-refundable credits, like the CDCC, can only reduce tax liability. In contrast, refund-
able credits, like the EITC and the CTC, can be paid out in cash to taxpayers who have
no remaining tax liability. Thus, once a taxpayer has subtracted the value of exemptions
and deduction from the adjusted gross income and calculated the resulting tax liability, the
18value of the CDCC cannot be greater than this amount. Increasing the statutory value of the
CDCC does not increase its value to the taxpayer if the tax liability constraint is binding.
A married couple with two children child can earn about $24,000 without tax liability. But
this does not mean that all couples with annual incomes greater than $24,000 were able to
beneﬁt from the CDCC expansion. For many taxpayers, the CDCC statutory value was
greater than their tax liability under the pre-2003 rules.
Figure 10 graphs the value of the CDCC in 2006 under both the pre-2003 and post-2003
rules for a married couple with two children and shows that most low-income families did not
beneﬁt from the CDCC expansion. The statutory changes to the CDCC made it appear that
most of the increase would go to low-income families who would be able to take advantage of
both the higher limit on qualifying expenses and higher credit rates. High-income families,
would only be able to take advantage of the higher limit on qualifying expenses as their credit
rate would stay ﬁxed at 20 percent. However, in reality, the credit rate increase (particularly
the increase of the maximum rate from 30 to 35 percent) beneﬁted very few taxpayers, and
not those with the lowest income.
The CDCC may be misunderstood by taxpayers. For example, a low-income married
couple with two children earning about $22,000 annually may believe that the CDCC oﬀers
a $1,860 subsidy on $6,000 of child care costs. Many of the “child care tax tips” that one
ﬁnds on websites and newsletters during tax season show the CDCC rules and suggest that
low-income families would qualify for this child care subsidy. But, this couple has no tax
liability because they can claim the standard deduction and dependent exemptions and thus
cannot beneﬁt from the CDCC. It is the interaction with other income tax provisions that
render the CDCC worthless to low income families. These families also have nothing to
gain from participation in employer provided child care ﬂexible spending accounts because
they have no tax liability. Many families with children are in the range of the income
distribution where the CDCC is worthless. Nearly 10 percent of taxpayers with dependent
children have an annual income of less than $20,000 and another 12 percent make between
19$20,000 and $30,000 (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 2007). In addition, low-income families
are more likely to have young children (under age 5) than middle or high-income families.
Recall, however, that welfare beneﬁts are excluded from this analysis and that some welfare
programs make special provisions for child care expenses. Thus, child care subsidies do exist
for low-income families that participate in certain welfare programs.
5 How do Child Tax Beneﬁts Compare to the Cost of
Raising Children?
The estimated $140 billion annual cost of child tax beneﬁts is large when compared to
other tax expenditures. For example the tax expenditure from the deductibility of mortgage
interest for owner-occupied homes is estimated at $85 billion, the tax expenditure from the
exclusion of pension contributions and earnings is estimated at $115 billion, and child tax
beneﬁts are even slightly more expensive that the tax expenditure from the exclusion of
employer contributions for medical insurance and care, which is estimated at $134 billion
(Analytical Perspectives, 2007). However, raising children can be very expensive, and that
$140 billion is spread over the 74 million children in the United States. This puts the annual
subsidy at a little less than $2,000 per child. How does this compare to the cost of raising
children?
There is some ambiguity about what is meant by the cost of raising children. Consumer
Expenditure Survey data can be used to determine the average level of spending for a house-
hold on goods and services for children. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) does
just this by publishing annual estimates of average level of expenditure on children for U.S.
households by income level. However, there is concern that not all spending categorized as
as spending on children by the USDA is actually a required cost of raising a child. Some
spending on children is probably better deﬁned as discretionary or a form of consumption by
20the parents. Thus, researchers can turn to measures of the minimal cost of raising children,
deﬁned as the level of expenditure on children necessary to maintain some minimum stan-
dard of living. U.S. poverty thresholds and guidelines and equivalence scales can be used to
back out the implied minimal cost of raising children.
The USDA, in calculating its estimates of average expenditure on children, includes
spending on child care, children’s clothing, and certain eduction expenses. The survey data
does not identify how much of the total spending on food and health care is due to children,
so these values are assigned using budget shares from a 1994 food expenditure survey and
a 1987 medical expenditure survey. Total spending on housing and transportation is simply
divided among household members on a per-capita basis so that, for example, one-half of
housing expenditure is attributable to the children in a two-parent family of four. For 2006,
the USDA estimates that the average level of expenditure on children for middle-income
married couples is about $11,000 per child (Lino, 2007). Thus the expansion of child tax
beneﬁts represents an increase in the subsidy value as a percentage of average expenditure
from 8.5 percent to 17.3 percent.
The USDA estimates provide some rough evidence on the marginal propensity to spend
on children. As shown in Table 2, the total expenditure on children by married couples
increases by about $9.50 for every $100 increase in income. This marginal propensity of
expenditure on children is lower than the share of total income spent on children, consistent
with the idea of some necessary level of expenditure, where expenditure on children does not
fall below a minimum level as total family income falls. Assuming a constant 0.095 marginal
propensity of child expenditure, the implied minimum level of expenditure is about $5,000.
This marginal propensity of spending on children suggest that the nearly $1,000 real increase
in child tax beneﬁts per child since 1992 likely resulted in less than a $100 annual increase
in expenditure on children in real terms. Note however, that both the real increase in child
tax beneﬁts and the marginal propensity of expenditure on children implied by the USDA
estimates are higher for single parents.
21Equivalence scales can be used to impute an estimate of the minimal cost of raising a
child. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) uses a simple equivalence scale to adjust for
family size in its annual computations of eﬀective federal tax rates by income quintile.16 The
CBO adjusts for family size by dividing household income by the square root of the household
size, often called the root-n equivalence scale. If we know the minimal level of expenditure
needed to maintain a basic standard of living for a reference household (the poverty line),
one can then use the root-n equivalence scale to compute the level of expenditure needed
to maintain that same standard of living for households of diﬀerent size. Using the 2006
poverty guideline for a family of four of $20,000 as the reference value, the cost of raising a
child implied by the root-n equivalence scale is easily calculated and given in the “Root-N
Scale” column of Table 3.
There are also more complex equivalence scales, such as the three-parameter equivalence
scale suggested by Betson (1996).17 The three parameters are α, which measure the needs of
secondary adults relative to single adults, β, which measures the relative needs of children
to the single adult and f, which measures the economies of scale in consumption. The scale
maps the number of adults in the household, A, and the number of children in the household,
K, to a scale index:
(1 + α(A − 1) + βK)
f (1)
An adjustment is made for a single parent’s ﬁrst child and for childless couples. The param-
eters are then estimate from expenditure data resulting in the following equivalence scale:
(1.8 + 0.5(K − 1))
0.7 for a single parent
(2 + 0.5K)
0.7 for two parents
(2)
16The CBO deﬁnes income categories by ranking all people by their comprehensive household income
adjusted for family size, so that each quintile contains an equal number of people instead of an equal number
of households.
17Betson’s three-parameter equivalence scale was later incorporated into the experimental poverty measure
reports published by the U.S. Census Bureau. The development of alternative measure of poverty including
the Betson scale is described in Short and Garner (2002).
22where a single adult with no children is assigned a scale value of 1 and a childless couple is
assigned a scale value of 1.41. Again, taking the 2006 poverty guideline value for a family of
four of $20,000, the cost of raising a child implied by the three-parameter equivalence scale is
quite similar to the cost implied by the root-n scale and is given as the “3 Parameter Scale”
column in Table 3.
Similar to these equivalence scales, the U.S. poverty thresholds also be used to back out
the implied cost of raising children for a family near the poverty level. The poverty threshold
increases in the number of children, so one can easily calculate the amount of additional
expenditure required for a family with an additional child to remain at the poverty level.
The cost of raising a child implied by the 2006 poverty thresholds is reported in the “Poverty
Thresholds” column in Table 3. One would expect the implied cost for a ﬁrst child to be
larger than the implied cost for a second child, and the implied cost of a second child to be
larger than the implied cost of a third child; however the poverty thresholds do not have this
property. Their non-monotonic nature has lead to widespread criticism.18
As illustrated by Table 3, the minimal cost of raising a child is in the $2,000 to $5,000
range. The average value of child tax beneﬁts is about $1,900, but for many families, the value
of child tax beneﬁts per child is much higher and falls within this range. Child tax beneﬁts
make up a large fraction of the minimal cost of raising children and a non-trivial fraction of
average family expenditure on children. It may be noted that in addition to these annual
expenses, families also set aside savings for their children, such as college funds. Of course
there are also important tax beneﬁts to lower the cost of saving for a child’s education and
tax credits which reduce the cost of paying a child’s tuition. These tax beneﬁts are excluded
from the analysis.
18The poverty thresholds were originally developed in the 1960s by Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security
Administration. They are adjusted for inﬂation each year by the Census Bureau, but are generally used
only for computing national poverty statistics. Welfare oﬃces use the U.S. poverty guidelines as issued each
year by the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the poverty thresholds to determine
welfare program eligibility. The 2006 poverty guidelines increase by $3,400 per child regardless of household
composition.
236 Conclusion
Child subsidies in the United States tax code are not given through a single well-designed
structure; instead, child tax beneﬁts come from various provisions that interact with each
other and other federal income tax features. The resulting subsidy for families with chil-
dren has some unusual properties (particularly for single parents) that seem unintentional.
Particularly important is the arguably unintentional interaction between the personal ex-
emption, standard deduction, and the tax value of the Child and Dependent Care Credit
which eliminates child care subsidies for many low-income families. A similar unintentional
relationship with the value of the personal exemption made the 2008 stimulus payment more
valuable for low-income taxpayers with fewer children even though the stimulus was sup-
posed to increase by $300 per child. A simpliﬁed family credit, such as the one proposed
by the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform to replace the hodgepodge
of tax provisions discussed in this paper, would be an eﬀective way of eliminating both the
peculiar characteristics of child tax beneﬁts and the unintentional interaction of the various
provisions.
Child tax beneﬁts in the U.S. have grown dramatically, more than doubling in value in
real terms since the early 1990s. The value of child tax beneﬁts increased slightly more
for low-income families than for middle-income families, and not at all for high-income
families. As arguably exogenous, changes to the value of child tax beneﬁts may represent an
opportunity for researchers looking for a natural experiment. Although this paper does not
identify cross-state variation, there is considerable variation across time and across family
income and family types.
As a fraction of the estimated cost of raising a child, child tax beneﬁts are large, yet the
increase in child tax beneﬁts has likely increased expenditure on children by only a small
amount, about $10 for every $100 of child tax beneﬁts. Child tax beneﬁts generally face
little open political opposition and have been a popular way to cut taxes. There are still
24a large number of pro-family groups lobbying for additional child tax beneﬁt increases and
it seems likely that the trend will continue. This makes further research on the incentives
associated with child tax beneﬁts very important.
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28Figure 3: 2006 Child Tax Beneﬁts for a Single Parent with 2 Children
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29Figure 4: 2008 Total Value of Child Tax Beneﬁts for Married Couples
30Figure 5: 2006 Child Tax Beneﬁts for Single Parents
31Figure 6: 2006 Marginal Tax Rates for Married Couples
32Figure 7: Real Change in Child Tax Beneﬁts









33Figure 8: Value of the 2008 Stimulus Payment for Married Couples
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35Figure 10: Value of the CDCC under the Pre-2003 and Post-2003 Rules
(2006 married couple with two children)
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36Table 1: Estimated Budgetary Cost of Child Tax Beneﬁts
(billions of dollars)
1992 1996 1999 2004 2006
Dependent Exemption 24.1 30.7 35.8 36.4 35.9
Earned Income Credit 13.0 28.2 31.3 38.0 40.2
Child Tax Credit – – 19.9 31.2∗ 56.2
Child Care Expenses 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.9
Head of Household Status 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1
TOTAL 43.5 65.8 93.8 113.1 140.3
Number of Children (millions) 66.5 70.2 71.9 73.3 73.7
Expenditure per Child $654 $937 $1,305 $1,543 $1,904
Real Expenditure per Child $940 $1,204 $1,579 $1,647 $1,904
* does not include the early child tax credit payments made in 2003
Sources: OMB analytical perspectives tables 5-1 and 19-1 various years, IRS statistics of income
publications 1304, U.S. Census Bureau Table CH-1 (2007) Living Arrangements of Children Under
18 Years Old, and author’s calculations.
37Table 2: Estimated Marginal Propensity of Child Expenditure
Implied
Income Average Per Child Budget Marginal Propensity
Group Income Expenditure Share of Child Expenditure
Married Couples
Low-Income $27,800 $7,988 0.287 –
Middle-Income $59,300 $10,983 0.185 0.095
High-Income $112,200 $16,077 0.143 0.096
Single Parents
Low-Income $18,600 $7,567 0.407 –
High-Income $67,600 $16,097 0.238 0.174
Source: USDA, Expenditure on Children by Families, 2005
38Table 3: Implied Minimum Cost of Raising a Child
Married Couples Single Parents
Minimum Cost of Child Implied by: Minimum Cost of Child Implied by:
Number
of Poverty Root-N 3 Parameter Poverty Root-N 3 Parameter
Children Thresholds Scale Scale Thresholds Scale Scale
1 $2,727 $3,178 $4,534 $3,408 $4,142 $4,718
2 $4,217 $2,679 $2,396 $2,346 $3,178 $2,618
3 $3,615 $2,361 $2,279 $4,274 $2,679 $2,451
4 $2,879 $2,134 $2,183 $3,175 $2,361 $2,323
Source: 2006 Poverty Thresholds, 2006 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. Census Publication P60-205,
and author’s calculations.
39